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A R T I C L E S
WALKING THE TALK: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER
EXPLORATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL
AUTHENTICITY, EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY,
AND POST-MERGER PERFORMANCE
MARGARET CORDING
IMD
JEFFREY S. HARRISON
University of Richmond
ROBERT E. HOSKISSON
Rice University
KARSTEN JONSEN
IMD
Does consistency between how a firm treats employees (what it does) and its espoused
employee-oriented values (what it says) affect employee productivity? Furthermore,
given that the stakeholder theory perspective holds that what happens to one stake-
holder influences other stakeholders, does this sort of consistency vis-à-vis a firm’s
customers also influence employee productivity? We empirically investigate the influ-
ence of organizational authenticity—defined as consistency between a firm’s espoused
values and realized practices—in the context of a merger, and specifically during
post-merger integration. Our findings show that a lack of organizational authenticity
in terms of both under-promising and over-promising to both employees and customers
is associated with lower productivity, which in turn is related to long-term merger
performance, thus affecting outcomes for shareholders. These findings support the
importance of authenticity and should therefore be of interest to executives responsible
for ensuring the consistency between what a firm says and what it does, as well as
those who participate in and study the merger integration process. In particular, we
propose stakeholder theory as a helpful lens for examining the merger integration
process as well as other joint actions such as strategic alliances.
Despite a significant amount of research on merg-
ers, we still know little about what makes them
successful (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004).
Several researchers suggest that the integration pro-
cess is critical to the overall success of a merger.
Some of the important process-related variables
that have been studied include cultural fit (Chatter-
jee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Larsson &
Lubatkin, 2001; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1993),
procedural and distributive justice (Ellis, Reus, &
Lamont, 2009), employee resistance (Larsson & Fin-
kelstein, 1999), resource redeployment between the
firms (Capron, 1999; Capron, Mitchell, & Swamina-
than, 2001), integration speed (Graebner, 2004;
Homburg & Bucerius, 2006), task-related character-
istics associated with integration (Pablo, 1994), and
turnover rates (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Siegel
& Simmons, 2010; Zollo & Singh, 2004).
A common thread that runs through these studies
is the critical role that employee trust plays in
post-merger integration (Buono & Bowditch, 1989;
Graebner, 2009; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991;
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Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). Trust seems to act as
a lubricant that helps to “grease the wheels” during
post-merger integration, enabling the firm to effi-
ciently and effectively implement the changes re-
quired to extract economies of scale, economies of
scope, and other sources of value from the merger.
Yet trust is likely weakened precisely when it is
needed most. Some argue that the significant
changes, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities experi-
enced by employees during a merger impair their
trust in the newly merged firm (Stahl, Larsson,
Kremershof, & Sitkin, 2011), leading to undesirable
outcomes including diminished job satisfaction
and unintended turnover (Buono & Bowditch,
1989; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Emmanouilides
& Giovanis, 2006; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991).
Because mergers disrupt existing relationships
between the firm and its employees, we focus on
the role of implicit contracts and reciprocity in
building or damaging trust during post-merger in-
tegration, and we show that inconsistency between
words and deeds has negative consequences be-
yond what has previously been studied. We use the
construct of organizational authenticity—defined
as consistency between a firm’s espoused values
and its realized practices—to examine the degree to
which certain post-merger integration practices are
aligned with the firm’s espoused values. Our logic
is that espoused values such as fairness, openness,
and accountability create expectations for the way
the firm will behave. These expectations form an
implicit contract (Rousseau, 1995) between the
combined firm and its employees (de Luque, Wash-
burn, Waldman, & House, 2008; MacLeod & Mal-
comson, 1989). If a firm adheres to these values (is
authentic), it builds trust with employees because
they witness consistency between the firm’s words
and deeds, resulting in positive reciprocity (Blau,
1964; Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009; Simon,
1966; Vandewalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995).
Similarly, violation of implicit contracts may result
in negative reciprocity as an already fragile trust
environment is damaged.
Beyond their relationships with employees,
firms espouse values in their relationships with a
variety of other stakeholders, and thus create im-
plicit contracts with customers, suppliers, share-
holders, and so on. Because employees are highly
sensitive to clues of a firm’s trustworthiness during
post-merger integration, we expect that they will
respond to implicit contract breaches not only with
themselves (employees), but also with other stake-
holders, specifically customers. We build this argu-
ment on the concept of generalized exchange
(Ekeh, 1974), which is an important assumption in
stakeholder theory. Generalized exchange means
that the attitudes and behavior of one of a firm’s
stakeholders (in our case, employees) is influenced
by the firm’s behavior toward a different stake-
holder (in our case, customers) (Harrison, Bosse, &
Phillips, 2010). We analyze customers because we
believe that employees are attuned to the firm’s
authenticity toward customers given that employ-
ees’ opportunities and fortunes are dependent, in
part, on firm–customer interactions.
The aggregate impact of employees’ individual
acts of positive or negative reciprocity may mani-
fest in changes to firm-wide employee productivity
and therefore impact a third stakeholder—the
shareholder. We thus examine the impact of exec-
utive perceptions of changes in employee produc-
tivity on long-term merger performance. Figure 1
presents an overview of our conceptual model.
The setting for our study is the post-merger inte-
gration of horizontal mergers where two firms op-
erating in the same industry combine or restructure
operations (see Graebner, 2004; Zollo & Singh,
2004), enabling us to examine organizational au-
thenticity in a high-stress change context. In hori-
zontal mergers, the acquiring firm usually absorbs
the acquired firm into its operations to obtain cost
efficiencies (see Graebner, 2004; Zollo & Singh,
2004). In these cases, the acquiring firm’s manage-
ment dominates in the combined firm. Sometimes,
however, the goals of the horizontal merger dictate
more of a blending of the two firms (Haspeslagh &
Jemison, 1991); here, the acquired firm’s manage-
ment may play an important role in the newly
merged firm.
The origin of the newly merged firm’s top man-
agers is a critical issue in our study because es-
poused values represent a negotiation among top
managers (Bowman, 1984). If those managers are
mostly from the acquirer, the acquirer’s espoused
values are relevant for our organizational authen-
ticity construct. But if they originate from the ac-
quired firm, then the espoused values of the ac-
quired firm are most appropriate. Throughout this
paper, the phrase “espoused values” refers to the
stated values of the pre-merger firm from which
most of the top managers originated.
Our findings show that a lack of organizational
authenticity in terms of both under-promising (re-
alized practices exceed the expectations set by es-
poused values) and over-promising (realized prac-
tices fall short of the expectations set by espoused
2014 39Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson, and Jonsen
values) to both employees and customers is associ-
ated with lower productivity, which in turn is re-
lated to long-term merger performance, thus affect-
ing outcomes for shareholders. The results
challenge the conventional wisdom that firms are
better off when they “under-promise” by restrain-
ing their verbal commitment to values and exceed-
ing those commitments with the firm’s behavior.
To understand the theoretical mechanisms at
work, we first examine the concepts of implicit
contracts, trust, and reciprocity to better explain
the relationship between organizational authentic-
ity vis-à-vis employee values and employee pro-
ductivity. We then discuss the notion of general-
ized exchange to explore the theoretical foundation
of the relationship between employee productivity
and authenticity vis-à-vis customer values. We
draw on the resource-based view to hypothesize
that changes in firm-wide employee productivity
will be related to long-term merger performance. A
description of our methods, presentation of our
results, and discussion follow.
ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHENTICITY IN
POST-MERGER INTEGRATION
Alignment between espoused values and real-
ized practices has been hailed for decades in many
versions of the phrase “walk the talk.” Figure 2
shows, in a simplified way, how the degree of
alignment between espoused values and realized
practices may fall into one of four general catego-
ries: consistency between words and deeds (organ-
izational authenticity) with weak values and with
strong values, over-promising (when espoused val-
ues are greater than realized practices), and under-
promising (when realized practices are greater than
espoused values). A misalignment between what
the firm is doing and what it is telling its stakehold-
ers it values signals a lack of organizational au-
thenticity that, we argue, influences performance
outcomes.
Misalignments raise several questions: Is it best
to under-promise and over-deliver? Do espoused
FIGURE 1
Overview of Conceptual Model of Organizational Authenticity During Post-Merger Integration
FIGURE 2
Categories of Organizational Authenticity
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values matter, or are they merely window-dressing?
What impact does misalignment have on various
stakeholders? Our organizational authenticity con-
struct builds on Simons’ (2002) seminal work on
behavioral integrity. An individual-level construct,
behavioral integrity is defined as “the perceived
pattern of alignment between an actor’s words and
deeds” (Simons, 2002, p. 19). Others have ex-
panded the notion of authenticity to include the
organizational level (e.g., Freeman & Auster, 2011;
Liedtka, 2008); they consistently include the idea
that a firm that displays authenticity is one that is
willing to take action based on the values it es-
pouses (Paine, 1994).
During post-merger integration, there is much
temptation for the newly combined firm to disre-
gard espoused values. For example, a firm may
espouse values of open and honest communication,
but managers may withhold information from em-
ployees for fear that leaked negative information
could adversely influence either integration efforts
or the stock price (Harwood & Ashleigh, 2005).
Similarly, although firms may claim to value long-
term employee relationships, layoffs are not un-
common after horizontal mergers (O’Shaughnessy
& Flanagan, 1998). Depending on how the firm
handles the layoffs (whether they are perceived as
essential and how laid-off employees are treated),
such actions may be perceived as inconsistent with
the espoused value.
Theoretical Context: The Role of Trust, Implicit
Contracts, and Reciprocity
All else being equal, a rational actor would
choose an explicit contract rather than an implicit
one because the former clarifies the terms of ex-
change and creates legally enforceable obligations.
Implicit contracts arise in many situations simply
because it is either not efficient or not possible to
write an explicit contract (Asher, Mahoney, & Ma-
honey, 2005). Indeed, they are usually the most
efficient choice in situations where outcomes can
be observed only after the fact and/or when there
are tangible benefits from adapting the contract
given new information (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy,
2002). Some employees do not have explicit em-
ployment contracts, but all have implicit ones
(MacLeod & Malcomson, 1989). The optimal con-
tracting mode with some stakeholders may be a
combination of explicit and implicit contracts.
Just as upholding implicit contracts can lead to
positive reciprocity, behavior that breaches the im-
plicit contract is likely to lead to negative reciproc-
ity (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). A breach occurs
when a stakeholder believes the firm has acted
inconsistently with one or more of its obligations.
Such breaches have been found to be associated
with a variety of negative outcomes, including
lower commitment, higher turnover, erosion of
trust, and lower job satisfaction (e.g., Robin-
son, 1996).
Because they are complex and likely to require
change, implicit contracts require constant adjust-
ments and continuous coordination of activities.
Trust thus plays a critical role (McAllister, 1995;
Teerikangas, Véry, & Pisano, 2011) and often acts as
a primary mechanism to encourage the parties to
uphold their part of the contract. Trust is “the will-
ingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of
another party based on the expectations that the
other party will perform a particular action impor-
tant to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to
monitor and control the other party” (Mayer, Davis,
& Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). Trust is particularly
important with implicit contracts because, by def-
inition, such contracts cannot be legally enforced;
they must be self-enforcing. A contract is self-en-
forcing when the value of the future relationship to
each party is sufficiently large such that neither
party wishes to renege (Baker et al., 2002). Trust
lowers the costs and risk perceptions associated
with managing a contract (Hill, 1990; Williamson,
1991), and therefore assessments of the value of the
future relationship are maximized when one party
trusts the other (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Wang &
Barney, 2006).
The role of trust is likely to be especially relevant
during post-merger integration. The announcement
of a horizontal merger triggers anxiety in most em-
ployees—be they from the acquiring or the ac-
quired firm (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Emmanoui-
lides & Giovanis, 2006). People are highly sensitive
to trust-based information and cues during times of
uncertainty, such as mergers between companies
(e.g., Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991), because organiza-
tional changes cause people to question whether
their own perceptions of fairness are accurate
(Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2002). For
example, Lind, Greenberg, Scott, and Welchans
(2000) found that fairness-related judgments were
more strongly determined by events that occurred
during periods of organizational restructuring than
by judgments held before restructuring. Because
our organizational authenticity construct captures
inconsistencies between what the firm is doing and
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what it is telling its stakeholders, it is one impor-
tant way employees will assess the fairness of the
newly merged company.
Consider, for example, a firm that states that it
values employee empowerment. Such a firm cre-
ates expectations that it will encourage employee
participation, voice, and authority to make deci-
sions at lower levels. When the firm adheres to
these values in its realized practices during post-
merger integration—by, for example, involving em-
ployees from both the target and acquiring firms on
the integration teams—it upholds its implicit con-
tract with employees, trust in the firm is reinforced,
and employees can be expected to positively recip-
rocate, which should be manifest in increased pro-
ductivity. In contrast, the firm may keep all deci-
sion authority in the hands of a few key advisers
and thereby fail to realize the values it espoused.
Here, the firm has over-promised, and we would
expect negative reciprocity and a reduction in
productivity.
But what happens when the firm substantially
under-promises? Perhaps the firm was silent vis-à-
vis its espoused values regarding employee em-
powerment, but immediately after the merger it
forms teams composed of both target and acquiring
firm employees from various levels and empowers
them to make meaningful decisions about issues
that affect them. This firm has not demonstrated
organizational authenticity in that its behavior
was not aligned with the expectations it created. It
has breached its implicit contract with employees,
but it has done so in a positive way. Nonetheless,
we argue that this firm will fare less well than the
firm that demonstrates consistency between its es-
poused values and its behavior (although probably
better than the over-promising firm). Employees,
not expecting to be empowered, may at first react
cynically to the genuineness of the post-merger in-
tegration initiatives, observing with a careful eye
the question of whether or not empowerment will
be a lasting value in the newly merged firm.
Our argument is contrary to conventional wis-
dom that claims that under-promising and over-
delivering generally leads to the best outcome. The
marketing literature (e.g., Oliver, 1980) has pro-
vided evidence that firms should work to “delight”
customers by providing them with a product or
service that exceeds their expectations. While this
phenomenon may apply to products and services,
values are different. In the context of employees
and post-merger integration, a mismatch in terms of
espoused values and realized practices—even
when the realized practices are greater than the
espoused values—may result in negative reciproc-
ity and lower employee productivity relative to
firms that demonstrate organizational authenticity.
Theoretical Context: Generalized Exchange
Effects During Post-Merger Integration
Recall that in addition to employees, we are also
interested in knowing how espoused values and
realized practices affect other stakeholders. The
idea that the behavior of a particular stakeholder is
influenced, in part, by the firm’s relationships with
other stakeholders is foundational to stakeholder
theory (Harrison et al., 2010). Stakeholder-based
arguments tend to rely on the inherent assumption
that the whole of a firm’s relationships with its
stakeholders is greater than the sum of individual
relationships. This interconnectedness has been
somewhat neglected in the merger literature (Hale-
blian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davidson,
2009), and the concept of generalized exchange
(Ekeh, 1974), a central tenet of stakeholder theory,
helps explain why a firm’s relationship with one
stakeholder influences its relationships with other
stakeholders. Generalized exchange means that the
attitudes and behavior of one of a firm’s stakehold-
ers (in our case, employees) is influenced by the
firm’s behavior toward a different stakeholder (in
our case, customers). This logic suggests that em-
ployees will respond to implicit contract breaches
with other stakeholders, including customers.
Generalized exchange involves multiple actors
who are part of an integrated set of transactions in
which reciprocations are indirect (Bearman, 1997;
Ekeh, 1974). Interestingly, there need not be a one-
to-one correspondence between what they directly
give to and take from another actor. Because people
have memories, it is even possible that significant
time will elapse between events (Wade-Benzoni,
2002); the actors put decisions or behavior in the
context of other decisions or behavior over time.
Generalized exchange explains why employees
may be willing to take a pay cut or customers may
agree to rewrite a contract if they believe that such
behavior may be a part of the greater good for the
firm’s network of stakeholders (Harrison et al.,
2010). As Bosse et al. (2009, p. 449) explained:
“Reciprocity means that parties to an exchange
willingly sacrifice self-interest for the sake of their
principles. This can occur within dyadic relations
as well as among actors in a network of relation-
ships. Given the opportunity, third-party observers
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of an exchange will systematically reward or pun-
ish those they perceive as fair or unfair, respec-
tively.” Unfair behavior is likely to be more se-
verely punished than good behavior is to be
rewarded (Offerman, 2002).
There is reason to believe that newly merged
firms may fall short in delivering on customer es-
poused values during post-merger integration be-
cause so much time and attention are typically
devoted to integration activities (Yu, Engleman, &
Van de Ven, 2005), and the firm’s authenticity vis-
à-vis customers will be a signal to employees about
its trustworthiness. Pollock and Gulati (2007) ar-
gued that in order for a signal to have an impact it
should be important and visible to those who re-
ceive it. In other words, they must know about it
and care about it. Employees care about how their
firms treat customers because their own employ-
ment situation is directly related to the revenues
customers provide. Research has demonstrated that
the way a firm treats its customers can influence
employee satisfaction (Brown & Lam, 2008). Re-
garding visibility, employees receive regular re-
ports regarding customers from internal and exter-
nal sources, and some employees interact with
customers directly.
Applied to our current context, we expect that if
employees witness a lack of organizational authen-
ticity with respect to customer values during post-
merger integration, their trust in the merged firm
will be damaged, leading to negative reciprocity
and relatively lower employee productivity. We
expect this negative reciprocity in response to im-
plicit contract breaches arising from both over-
promising and under-promising. Similarly, firms
demonstrating organizational authenticity with
customers can expect positive reciprocity behav-
iors that lead to relatively higher employee
productivity.
Theoretical Context: Impact on Shareholders
A key question is whether the costs (benefits)
from negative (positive) reciprocity by employees
stemming from a lack (presence) of organizational
authenticity are passed along to shareholders. As
noted earlier, researchers argue that post-merger
integration contributes to performance problems
(e.g., Datta, 1991), but the previous literature has
been criticized for inadequate theoretical develop-
ment (Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & Best 1998). One
source of criticism is that most studies examine the
direct effects of explanatory variables on merger
performance without regard to important mediat-
ing variables (Cording, Christmann, & King, 2008).
We propose that a lack of organizational authentic-
ity is first associated with lower employee produc-
tivity, and that lower employee productivity is then
related to shareholder-based financial perfor-
mance. One reason we expect this sort of effect is
that productivity gains associated with organiza-
tional authenticity are likely to be hard to imitate,
or at least somewhat uncommon (Barney, 1988).
Given the logic above, we tested three research
questions: (1) Is the change in employee productiv-
ity during post-merger integration more positive for
firms whose employee espoused values are consis-
tent with their realized practices than for firms
whose employee espoused values and realized
practices are substantially inconsistent (e.g., over-
promising and under-promising)? (2) Is the change
in employee productivity during post-merger inte-
gration more positive for firms whose customer
espoused values are consistent with their cus-
tomer realized practices than for firms whose
customer espoused values and customer realized
practices are substantially inconsistent? (3) Does
increased employee productivity associated with
organizational authenticity facilitate greater
merger performance?
METHODOLOGY AND MEASURES
We used three data collection methods. First, a
survey questionnaire collected data on realized
practices as well as executive perceptions of
changes in firm-wide employee productivity. Sec-
ond, computer-aided text analysis (CATA) of an-
nual reports measured the espoused values of the
firms that responded to the survey. Third, archival
data were compiled to measure long-term merger
performance and control variables. Our multi-
source research design is intended to maximize the
validity of our results.
Sample
We restricted our study population to horizontal
mergers to ensure that integration activities were
required. We defined horizontal mergers as those in
which the target and acquirer had at least one four-
digit Standard Industrial Classification code in
common. To avoid cross-cultural issues, we also
required that both the acquirer and the target were
United States–based. We used Securities Data Cor-
poration’s (SDC) Platinum database to identify
2014 43Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson, and Jonsen
these mergers. In addition, the acquiring firms had
to have stock price data available for 36 months
after the merger. A total of 428 mergers met these
criteria.
Telephone conversations indicated that 51 ac-
quirers had policies prohibiting survey responses.
Our mailing sample thus comprised 377 transac-
tions. Responses corresponding to 137 mergers
were returned for a 36% response rate. Eight re-
sponses were eliminated due to missing data, re-
sulting in a final sample of 129 mergers. These
mergers occurred in a wide range of industries,
from aerospace to financial services to telecommu-
nications. Respondents were the senior-most execu-
tive with direct responsibility for the post-merger in-
tegration: 40% were top executives,1 40% were heads
of business development, and the remaining 20%
were executives with direct line responsibility. To
test for inter-rater reliability, we received multiple
responses from 33 of the mergers. We found a high
level of generalizability in the responses.
Measures
Table 1 summarizes our operationalization of the
variables in our study. Below, we describe how we
measured merger performance, employee produc-
tivity, and the components of organizational au-
thenticity: espoused values and realized practices.
Merger performance. We measured merger per-
formance with the three-year post-merger abnormal
stock performance of the acquirer. The length of the
window studied is important, and longer periods
can lead to confounding effects and weaker statis-
tical power (cf. McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). How-
ever, the nature of an event is crucial to the length
of the event window chosen for study (Oler, Harri-
son, & Allen, 2008; Ryngaert & Netter, 1990), and
for post-merger integration variables, several years
is a recommended time frame (cf. Schweiger & De-
Nisi, 1991). We selected a three-year time horizon
for two reasons. First, it is consistent with existing
guidance (Lubatkin, 1983) and common practice in
the merger literature (e.g., Cording, Christmann, &
Weigelt, 2010; Farjoun, 1998). Second, three years
is sufficient time to observe changes in post-merger
performance after merger integration (Lubatkin,
Schulze, Mainkar, & Cotterill, 2001). We use Jen-
sen’s alpha (Jensen, 1968) as our measure of share-
holder-based merger performance. Jensen’s alpha is
a measure of the abnormal return between compet-
ing investments and has been used in the merger
(Cording et al., 2008) and diversification literatures
(e.g., Farjoun, 1998; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, &
Moesel, 1993). The Center for Research on Securi-
ties Prices (CRSP) equally weighted index was used
for the market benchmark.
Employee productivity. We used a four-item
scale adapted from Brockner, Grover, Reed, and
DeWitt (1992) and Brockner, Tyler, and Cooper-
Schneider (1992) to measure employee productiv-
ity. These authors measured the change in employee
work effort after a firm-wide layoff initiative relative
to before the initiative. Our interest was in the change
in employee productivity during post-merger integra-
tion relative to before the merger. Respondents were
asked to report the extent to which each item
changed, considering all affected employees, during
the height of the integration process relative to before
the merger was announced. We averaged the four
items (  .91) for our measure.
Espoused values. We used CATA of annual re-
ports to collect data on espoused values. Public
documents such as annual reports reflect a consen-
sus among the top management team, and therefore
represent the values of the firm (e.g., Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Weber, 1996) and not the idiosyn-
cratic values of any one individual (Bowman, 1984;
Enz, 1988). We thus analyzed the annual report of
the pre-merger firm from which most of the post-
merger top management originated. The acquiring
firm was the dominant pre-merger firm in 83% of
the mergers in our sample. That is, target firm man-
agers formed the bulk of the newly merged top
management team in only 17% of cases.
The underlying assumptions in CATA are that
the firm leaves traces of its value patterns in its
documents and that those patterns can be measured
by counting the frequency with which the values
are referenced. A strong value is referenced often; a
weak value is not (Huff, 1990). In the CATA pro-
cess, a computer examines the text for specified
words or phrases contained in a content dictionary,
a compilation of words or phrases that refer to the
concept being measured. The computer program
rates each sentence according to whether it con-
tains theme-related words. Standard dictionaries
exist (e.g., Harvard IV Psycho-Social Dictionary),
although we, as others (e.g., Kabanoff, Waldersee, &
Cohen, 1995), found it necessary to build a custom
dictionary.
1 Chair and Vice-Chair; Chief Executive Officer; Pres-
ident; Chief Financial Officer; Chief Operating Officer;
Chief Information Officer.
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TABLE 1
Variable Definitions and Construction
Variable Data source Description Alpha
Dependent variables
Changes in employee
productivity
Survey questionnaire Please think back to two points in time: the height of the integration process
and just before the merger was announced. Please indicate your opinion
as to how each item changed, considering all affected employees, during
the height of the integration process relative to before the merger
announcement (1  significant decrease; 7  significant increase):
(a) employee job performance, (b) employee productivity, (c) amount of
work effort expended by employees, and (d) employee morale.
.91
Merger performance CRSP Three-year post-merger abnormal stock performance measured with Jensen’s
alpha (Jensen, 1968). The CRSP equally weighted index was used for the
market benchmark. As a robustness check, we also tested the employee
productivity–merger performance relationship using the monthly
cumulative abnormal returns for the period beginning one month prior to
the merger’s effective date and ending 35 months later.
NA
Independent variables
Employee espoused
values
Computer-aided text
analysis
Average of eight values oriented toward employees: employee orientation,
employee development, interpersonal relations, empowerment, openness,
fairness, accountability, and community contributions. (See Table 2 for
additional information.)
.70
Customer espoused
values
Computer-aided text
analysis
Average of three values oriented toward customers: customer value/product
quality, product orientation, and customer orientation. (See Table 2 for
additional information.)
.77
Employee realized
practices
Survey questionnaire a. Please indicate below the extent to which the following principles or
objectives guided decisions during the integration phase of the merger
(1  not at all; 7  to a very large extent):
• The best people were retained regardless of company affiliation.
• Integration included participation from executives of both firms at every
step.
• People were treated with dignity, respect, and fairness.
• During the integration process, promises made were promises kept.
b. Please indicate the extent to which the integration process (1  not at all;
7  to a very large extent):
• Involved members of both organizations.
• Included employees from various levels within both firms.
• Applied consistent procedures and principles in making and
implementing decisions.
c. Please indicate below the extent to which your company utilized skills
retraining programs to help employees with the horizontal merger
integration (1  not at all; 7  extensively).
d. During the integration phase, please indicate your assessment of the
frequency of the company’s communications regarding the merger and
integration process to employees (1  none; 7  frequent).
e. Please indicate below the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements regarding the merger-related employee terminations
(1  strongly disagree; 7  strongly agree):
• The company offered significant assistance to terminated employees in
finding a new job.
• The company offered severance packages in excess of the industry
average to terminated employees.
• The company invested substantial resources to facilitate the transition
of terminated employees.
• The criteria for employee terminations were applied consistently across
all employees.
.85
(table continues)
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Our CATA analysis yielded eight espoused values
related to employees (e.g., fairness, empowerment,
and accountability), and three related to customers
(e.g., customer service). Each value is described in
Table 2, along with examples of coded text. Our em-
ployee espoused values measure is the average of the
eight employee-oriented values (  .70); our cus-
tomer espoused values measure is the average of the
three customer values (  .77). We rescaled both
measures of espoused values from the frequency
scale to a 1–7 Likert scale to be consistent with our
realized practices measures scale.
Realized practices. We collected data on real-
ized practices in the merged company via our sur-
vey questionnaire, which sought to measure real-
ized practices that are consistent with espoused
values in the context of post-merger integration.
For instance, the employee value of openness cor-
responds well with the “frequency of the compa-
ny’s communications” during the merger integra-
tion, the employee value of fairness is linked to the
behavior of treating people “with dignity, respect,
and fairness,” and customer value/product quality
is associated with whether “integration decisions
TABLE 1
(Continued)
Variable Data source Description Alpha
Customer realized
practices
Survey questionnaire a. Please indicate below the extent to which the following principles or
objectives guided decisions during the integration phase of the merger
(1  not at all; 7  to a very large extent):
• Decisions were made based on what was best for the customer.
• Integration decisions sought to improve the value delivered to
customers.
b. Did the following marketing- and sales-related items increase or decrease
after the merger relative to before the merger, considering the combined
pre-merger activities of both the acquirer and the target?
(1  decreased greatly; 7  increased greatly):
• Depth of customer coverage.
• Product/service quality.
• Company commitment to serving customers.
• Measures of customer service.
.85
Control variables
Integration speed Survey questionnaire Approximately how long did the integration process take? 1  less than
6 months; 2  712 months; 3  1318 months; 4  1924 months;
5  more than 24 months; 6  not yet complete.
NA
Relative size of target
to acquirer
SDC Average of the ratio of the (1) target’s market capitalization in the year prior
to the merger to that of the acquirer’s and (2) target’s annual sales prior to
the merger to that of the acquirer’s sales.
.87
Acquirer merger
experience
SDC and survey
questionnaire
Count of acquisitions made in the five years prior to the focal merger.
Over the five years preceding this acquisition, approximately how many
acquisitions did the acquirer complete? 1  none; 2  12 months;
3  34 months; 4  56 months; 5  7 or more months.
.81
Target’s pre-merger
ROE
SDC Average of the target’s pre-merger return on equity for the three years
preceding the merger minus the average of the industry return on equity
over the same time period.
NA
Acquirer’s pre-
merger ROE
SDC Average of the acquirer’s pre-merger return on equity for the three years
preceding the merger minus the average of the industry return on equity
over the same time period.
NA
Pre-merger
respondent
affiliation
Survey questionnaire Prior to the acquisition, your affiliation was with the: acquirer (scored as
“1”) or target (“0”).
NA
Announcement effect CRSP Cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirer for the 3-day period
surrounding the merger announcement.
% of employees laid
off
Survey questionnaire Approximately what percentage of the combined workforce was terminated
as a result of this merger? 1  none, 2  1%5%; 3  6%10%;
4  11%15%; 5  16%20%; 6  more than 20%.
NA
Subsequent mergers SDC Count of acquisitions made by the acquirer in the three years subsequent to
the focal merger.
NA
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sought to improve the value delivered to custom-
ers.” See Table 1 for the actual survey questions.
Analytic Technique
To examine the effects of organizational authen-
ticity on employee productivity, we used polyno-
mial regression analysis and response surface mod-
eling (Edwards, 2002; Edwards & Parry, 1993). This
analytic approach enabled us to explore the effects
of different combinations of realized practices and
espoused values on employee productivity because
it provides more specific information than can be
gleaned with difference scores (see Edwards, 2002,
for a useful review). In polynomial regression anal-
ysis, differences are not calculated directly but are
evaluated via the pattern of results of progressively
higher-order equations.
Our first step was to specify the proper uncon-
strained linear equation for testing, which is repre-
sented conceptually by the algebraic difference and
predicted employee productivity with the follow-
ing general equation:
Employee Productivity  B0  B1 Realized
Practices  B2 Espoused Values  e
If this unconstrained equation is significant, then
we proceed to test the quadratic equation. A signif-
icant change in the R2 of the quadratic equation
when compared to the linear equation indicates
that the effects of espoused values and realized
practices (organizational authenticity) on employee
productivity are more complex than a simple dif-
ference score. In this case, response surface model-
ing is used to estimate a three-dimensional data
display representing the relationships between es-
poused values, realized practices, and employee
productivity. Our model’s general expression is:
Employee Productivity  B0  B1 Realized
Practices  B2 Espoused Values  B3
Realized Practices2  B4 Realized
*Espoused  B5 Espoused Values
2  e.
RESULTS
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and corre-
lations among the studied variables. Measures of
espoused values and realized practices were scale-
centered (Edwards, 2002). We assessed the pres-
ence of multicollinearity through condition indices
and variance inflation factors; it was not a substan-
tive concern (Atkins & Wood, 2002).
Table 4 presents the results of our empirical tests.
Models 1 and 2 provide evidence on the effects of
organizational authenticity vis-à-vis employee val-
ues; Models 3 and 4 address organizational authen-
ticity vis-à-vis customer values. The linear equa-
TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Employee productivity 1.00
2. Merger performance .27 1.00
3. Employee espoused values .02 .01 1.00
4. Employee realized practices .34 .03 .07 1.00
5. Customer espoused values .20 .08 .15 .14 1.00
6. Customer realized practices .47 .17 .15 .36 .45 1.00
7. Integration speed .18 .25 .04 .11 .08 .15 1.00
8. Relative size .21 .10 .05 .12 .18 .15 .24 1.00
9. Merger experience .01 .12 .04 .04 .19 .17 .01 .30 1.00
10. Target pre-merger ROE .01 .20 .08 .11 .01 .15 .05 .05 .19 1.00
11. Acquirer pre-merger ROE .10 .11 .15 .13 .34 .17 .02 .27 .17 .01 1.00
12. Respondent affiliation .21 .11 .08 .19 .15 .21 .16 .33 .21 .02 .14 1.00
13. Announcement returns .04 .18 .02 .20 .02 .07 .14 .12 .08 .06 .10 .11 1.00
14. % laid off .13 .05 .06 .08 .01 .08 .06 .04 .08 .05 .01 .13 .14 1.00
15. Subsequent mergers .05 .11 .02 .02 .03 .07 .24 .19 .08 .14 .07 .01 .08 .05 1.00
Mean 4.35 .00 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.03 2.81 .51 3.31 .04 .02 .83 .03 2.36 2.20
Standard deviation .95 .02 .87 .93 1.01 .91 1.35 .54 1.31 .18 .25 .38 .07 1.56 2.81
Abbreviations: p  .05: correlations greater than .17; p  .01: correlations greater than .22; p  .001: correlations greater than .28.
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tions for employees (Model 1) and customers
(Model 3) are significant (R2  .17, p  .01, and
R2  .28, p  .001 respectively), indicating statis-
tically significant effects of realized practices but
not of espoused values. However, the quadratic
equations (Models 2 and 4, respectively) reflect a
statistically significant increase in variance ex-
plained when compared to the linear models
(R2  .07, p  .001 for employees and R2  .06,
p  .001 for customers). We evaluate the im-
provement in the overall fit of the model (as
reflected by changes in R2) rather than the signif-
icance of individual coefficients because the qua-
dratic equation simply adds three quadratic
terms (realized practices squared, the product of
realized practices and espoused values, and es-
poused values squared) to the linear model (Ed-
wards & Parry, 1993).
Our results suggest that the relationship between
organizational authenticity and employee produc-
tivity is more complex than a simple linear model
can capture. The impact of realized practices on
employee productivity is a function in part of the
level of espoused values. Hence, we do not inter-
pret individual coefficients but rather interpret
the effects using response surface modeling.
We plot the quadratic equations in Figure 3 (em-
ployee values and practices) and Figure 4 (cus-
tomer values and practices). Because we scale-cen-
tered the variables, they range from 3 to 3.
Interpreting two areas of these graphs is critical for
our analysis. The first is the shape of the surface
along the line where espoused values are equal and
opposite to realized practices (the espoused  –re-
alized line). This line runs diagonally from the
lower left to the upper right along the horizontal
plane in Figures 3 and 4. The end points represent
the points of maximum misalignment (i.e., es-
poused values are maximized and realized prac-
tices are minimized and vice versa). The second
TABLE 4
Results of Empirical Tests
Variable
Organizational authenticity vis-à-vis:
Merger performanceEmployees Customers
Model 1:
linear
Model 2:
quadratic
Model 3:
linear
Model 4:
quadratic
Model 5:
controls
Model 6:
main effects
Control variables
Speed of integration .10 .03 .06 .03 .21* .20*
Relative size .12 .11 .14 .11 .11 .06
Merger experience .08 .08 .15 .13 .11 .09
Target profitability .05 .05 .11 .04 .21* .20*
Acquirer profitability .03 .07 .00 .01 .13 .15
Respondent affiliation .11 .09 .09 .05
Announcement returns .18* .18*
% employees laid off .00 .03
Subsequent mergers .00 .03
Employee authenticity
Realized practices (b1) .30*** .06
Espoused values (b2) .01 .22
Realized2 (b3) .09
Espoused  realized (b4) .50**
Espoused2 (b5) .04
Customer authenticity
Realized practices (b1) .48*** .35**
Espoused values (b2) .03 .01
Realized2 (b3) .22
Espoused  realized (b4) .12
Espoused2 (b5) .08
Employee productivity .24**
R2 .17** .24*** .28*** .34*** .16** .22**
Change in R2 .07*** .06*** .08***
(Standardized coefficients; n  129)
*p  .05; **p  .01; ***p  .001
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important area is along the line where espoused
values are equal to realized practices (the espoused 
realized line), which runs from the upper left cor-
ner to the lower right corner. This is the line of
“perfect” alignment between espoused values and
realized practices.
Looking at Figure 3, we see that employee
productivity is roughly maximized along the
espoused  realized line for organizational authen-
ticity vis-à-vis employee values. The figure also
suggests that employee productivity is maximized
when employee espoused values and realized prac-
FIGURE 3
Inconsistency Effects of Employee Espoused Values and Realized Practices on Employee Productivity
FIGURE 4
Inconsistency Effects of Customer Espoused Values and Realized Practices on Employee Productivity
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tices are both high. The minimum point occurs
when espoused values are at the highest point and
realized practices are at the lowest point—the max-
imum over-promising point. Employee productiv-
ity is also low when espoused values are at the
lowest point and realized practices are at the high-
est point—the maximum under-promising point.
Employee productivity is higher for firms that un-
der-promise relative to firms that over-promise.
These results address our first research question:
Changes in employee productivity during post-
merger integration are more positive for firms
whose employee espoused values are consistent
with their realized practices than for firms whose
employee espoused values and realized practices
are substantially inconsistent, even when the firm
under-promises.
Turning to organizational authenticity vis-à-vis
customer values (Figure 4), we find that realized
practices have a greater influence than was the case
with employee values. The graph more resembles a
plane, although employee productivity is still max-
imized at the point where espoused values and
realized practices are both high (the upper left cor-
ner) and minimized at the point of maximum over-
promising: espoused values (the lower left corner).
However, under-promising has a more muted effect
on employee productivity, perhaps because em-
ployees may be less attuned to the espoused values
of the firm as they relate to customers. Thus, in
answer to our second research question, employee
productivity is affected by the firm’s authenticity
relative to customers.
Table 4 also presents the results of our empirical
tests regarding the effect of employee productivity
on merger performance (Models 5 and 6). We find
that employee productivity has a significant effect
on merger performance when measured by Jensen’s
alpha (b  .24, p  .01). As a robustness check, we
also tested to see if employee productivity had a
significant effect on merger performance when
measured by 36-month cumulative abnormal re-
turns, and found that it does (b  .18, p  .05),
which establishes some validity to our results using
Jensen’s alpha.
We also checked to see if employee productivity
mediated the relationship between organizational
authenticity and merger performance. Using Baron
and Kenny’s (1986) approach, we find that it is a
partial to full mediator. Accordingly, in answer to
our third research question, employee productivity
due in part to organizational authenticity is related
to merger performance using several measures (Jen-
sen’s alpha and cumulative abnormal returns).
DISCUSSION
The merger literature suggests that effective post-
merger integration is essential to creating value
from mergers. Post-merger integration is a time of
uncertainty and distrust; layoffs and executive
turnover are common, and the divergent cultures of
the acquiring and target firms can cause integration
difficulties. At this time attention is turned to firm
values. Often, the intent of horizontal mergers is to
increase efficiency by integrating the operations of
the acquiring and target firms. Consequently, the
managers of the combined firm need their employ-
ees to cooperate to achieve a successful integration.
We argue that employees will reciprocate posi-
tively through additional effort if they feel that the
newly formed firm’s behavior during the post-
merger integration period is consistent with the
implicit contracts they have formed through expec-
tations based on espoused firm values. We refer to
this concept as organizational authenticity. A vio-
lation of implicit contracts—through either over-
promising or significant under-promising—will
lead to negative reciprocity.
Using polynomial regression analysis, we were
able to glean a nuanced perspective on the relation-
ship between our variables. Our results suggest that
the notion of under-promising—being “quiet” with
words but “loud” with behavior—is a suboptimal
strategy when employee realized practices substan-
tially exceed employee espoused values. This
counterintuitive finding deserves to be highlighted.
While realized practices had a strong direct effect
on employee productivity in our models, firms that
materially under-promise performed worse than
those where the rhetoric matched the realized prac-
tices, all else being equal. As our theory predicted,
we find that even “good” behavior can breach im-
plicit contracts and have negative effects on em-
ployee productivity. However, we do not find that
under-promising with respect to customer values
and practices results in lower employee productiv-
ity. This may be because the firm’s espoused cus-
tomer values are less important to employees than
are espoused employee values, especially when
employees are focused on their own situation (e.g.,
future employment).
Our finding with regard to the relationship be-
tween customer authenticity and employee behav-
ior (in terms of productivity) makes an important
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empirical contribution to the stakeholder literature.
Scholars in a variety of disciplines have argued that
excellent treatment of their particular stakeholder
of interest can lead to economic advantages—
marketing focuses on customer interests, human
resource management on employee relationships,
and so on. But stakeholder theory is not just the
sum of other disciplines. It is unique in its claim
that the nature of the relationship with a particular
stakeholder is dependent, in part, on the firm’s
behavior toward other stakeholders (Freeman et al.,
2007; Rowley, 1997). This assumption is referred to
as generalized exchange (Ekeh, 1974; Harrison et
al., 2010). Thus, stakeholder theory argues that
there are not only one-on-one effects from stake-
holder relationships but synergistic effects as well.
Despite its importance to the stakeholder literature,
empirical evidence of generalized exchange in a
business setting is almost nonexistent.
Internally focused process variables have been
studied at length in relation to post-merger integra-
tion, and as a result cultural misfits and values
clashes are typical perceived culprits preventing
smooth successful mergers or acquisitions. Stake-
holder theory may prove to be a different and com-
plementary lens for understanding post-merger inte-
gration (as well as other strategic initiatives such as
alliances and joint ventures) because it draws our
attention to the management of key (inter)relation-
ships that underlie value creation and destruction.
Through its focus on honoring or breaching im-
plicit contracts with stakeholders, organizational
authenticity emerges as a central factor requiring
management’s attention during periods of organi-
zational change. We found evidence that is con-
trary to the idea that mergers may provide oppor-
tunities for acquiring firms to disregard previously
established implicit contracts with employees (e.g.,
Shleifer & Summers, 1988). While our focus was on
employee reactions to organizational authenticity
vis-à-vis employees and customers, future research
should examine the effects of contract breaches and
generalized exchange effects with a wider range of
stakeholders (e.g., suppliers) as well as other forms
of contractual breaches.
Much of the merger literature models the direct
effects of explanatory variables on merger perfor-
mance. Our finding that employee productivity is
an important intervening variable deepens our un-
derstanding of how post-merger integration deci-
sions affect merger performance. By providing
more evidence on the links among implicit con-
tracts, employee productivity, and shareholder re-
turns, we provide a clearer picture of the relation-
ship between stakeholder management and merger
performance. Despite this contribution we ac-
knowledge that post-merger integration is a com-
plex matter. Consistency, and thereby authenticity,
captures an important element and explains some
more of the unknown variance alluded to in our
introduction. Nevertheless, authenticity alone
is not the holy grail of merger integration, and
negative outcomes might occur despite high au-
thenticity, just as integrity does not make a person
good by itself. For example, some employees
may not like the changes and new values “im-
posed” during a merger and will choose to resign.
Our study has important implications for manag-
ers. Executives engaged in post-merger integration
should pay attention to the match between es-
poused values and realized practices. Our results
indicate that a large gap between espoused values
and realized practices in either direction (i.e., over-
promising or under-promising) is suboptimal. They
also highlight the interconnectedness of stakehold-
ers; employees react significantly to breaches in the
implicit contract not only with themselves but also
with customers. Managers should therefore use cau-
tion in communicating, thinking carefully about a
firm’s values to ensure that it is prepared to live by
them before speaking them. As such “walking the
talk” and “talking the walk” are two sides of the same
authenticity coin.
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